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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper describes how 40 Polish financial analysts associate various kinds of economic, political 
news and technical analysis signals with the future stock prices.  The financial analysts and dealers 
employed by various Polish capital market institutions were asked to mark a score to each item of 
the questionnaire, depending on how they estimated the impact of the item for the future behavior of 
stock prices.  The principal axis method of factor analysis yielded 4 factors (including economic, 
political and “technical” measures) on which stock prices would depend explaining as much as 45% 
of total variance: 
-  The growth of foreign and domestic investments in stock market; 
-  The withdrawal of foreign and domestic investments from stock market; 
-  Unfavorable macroeconomic and political signals; 
-  Positive financial and macroeconomic signals. 
The cluster analysis revealed that the participants marked most of items as strongly affecting future 
stock prices regardless if their nature was economic, political or “technical”. 
Considering many esoteric signals, indicated by respondents as responsible for stock market 
movements, the financial analysts seem to be subject to some psychological biases, which have big 
impact on their judgements.   
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INTRODUCTION  
 
There is an evidence that stock prices are meaningful in the sense of reflecting some real 
economic variables. (Lorie, 1985)  For the accurate prophecy of future stock prices, an identification 
of the factors leading stock market is needed.  However, research shows that only a fraction of 
return variation can be explained by publicly known news. (Cutler, 1989), (Fama, 1981)  The level 
of real dividends payments, industrial production, real money supply, interest rates, CPI inflation rate 
and market volatility can explain some fraction of share price movements.  The most of variation in 
returns cannot be explained using readily available measures of new information.  In spite of a long 
list of publications proving that market movement is random (Cootner, 1964) or at least very difficult 
to predict (Lo, 1999), a lot of effort is made in order to foresee future prices (Bernstein, 1992).  
Stock movements might be random but correlated with some (also randomly occurring) economic or 
political news.  What more, the precise market prediction based on public news is much more 
difficult than the post hoc linking of major market movements to the release of economic or other 
information. 
Research carried out by De Bondt and Thaler (1990) shows that stock prices changes forecasted 
by students were too extreme to be considered rational.  Similar pattern of overreaction found in the 
predictions of naive undergraduates was replicated in the predictions of stock market professionals.  
The authors’ inference from the research is to take seriously behavioral explanations of anomalous 
financial market outcomes. 
As Cray and Haines (1992) noticed that the portfolio management, in spite of several normative 
models existence, was not well understood in a purely descriptive sense.  Cray and Haines’s work 
concentrated on verbal descriptions about how financial managers really make investment decisions.   
The present research shows how financial analysts associate various kinds of news and technical 
analysis signals with the future stock prices.  60-item questionnaires were presented to 40 Polish 
financial analysts.  All questionnaire participants managed funds at Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) 
in 1990’s.   
The Warsaw Stock Exchange is the principal institution of Poland’s capital market.  The first 
stock exchange in Warsaw opened in 1817.  The World War II and the subsequent decades of   4
communism interrupted exchange operations. The Warsaw Stock Exchange commenced the activity 
in its present form in 1991, with electronic paperless trading and regulations based on the modern 
international standards.  Following a review of several contemporary markets, a system based on 
French experience was adopted and implemented.  In October 1994, the Warsaw Stock Exchange 
was admitted as a full member to the International Federation of Stock Exchanges. 
Transactions are concluded in two systems: single-price auction and the continuous trading.  All 
companies are traded in the single-price auction system.  Shares of the most liquid companies of the 
main market are also traded in the continuous quotation system.  Company shares may be listed on 
the Exchange in three different markets: the main, parallel and free market.  Disclosure requirements 
are the same for all companies, regardless of their quotation market.  The quotation market is 
indicative of the liquidity and risk level resulting from a company size as well as its history and the 
financial results achieved in the past. 
Table 1 shows some basic statistics of the Warsaw Stock Exchange for the last few years.   5
 
 
  1998  1997  1996  1995  1994  1993  1992  1991 
                 
Number of 
investment 
accounts at the end 
of period 
1 262 
212 
1 181 000  894 144  807 593  831 366  281 006  162 222  53885  
SINGLE PRICE AUCTION, MAIN MARKET 
Number of listed 
companies (end of 
period) 
117  96  66  53  36  21  16  9 
Capitalisation at 
year-end (PLN mln) 
68 082  38 107  23 036  10 902  7 149  5 803  351  161 
WIG (end of period)  12 795,6  14 668,0  14 342,8  7 585,9  7 473,1  12 439,0  1 040,7  919,1 
PLN return on the 
WIG index (%) 
-12,8  2,3  89,1  1,5  -39,9  1 095,3  13,2  --- 
Average P/E ratio  12,6  14,9  12,3  7,8  16,4  13,3  3,4  4,1 
Average P/BV ratio  1,51  1,85  1,91  1,47  3,43  2,14  0,60  0,47 
Dividend yield at 
the end of period 
(%) 
0,9  1,5  1,2  2,3  0,4  0,4  5,5  0,0 
Number of orders 
per session 
29 506  30 106  25 704  26 475  52 974  17 323  3 119  1 423 
Average buy order 
value (PLN) 
21 098  23 598  23 580  11 559  6 797  6 170  2 640  1 370 
Average sell order 
value (PLN) 
12 552  12 070  9 851  5 347  5 452  7 540  2 060  1 080 
Number of 
transactions per 
session 
9 766  9 891  8 074  7 164  24 594  9 832  1 233  877 
Average value of 
transaction (PLN) 
16 044  14 633  12 688  6 814  4 895  5 180  1 852  926 
Turnover value per 
session (PLN mln)  
156,7  144,7  102,4  49,0  120,4  51,0  2,3  0,8 
Total turnover value 
(PLN mln) 
39 170  36 038  25 611  12 200  22 640  7 750  230  30 
 
Table 1 Basic historical statistics of the main market single price auction at the Warsaw Stock Exchange.  
(www.wse.com.pl)   6
 
 
 
METHOD  
 
The main material was presented as a 60-item questionnaire.  4 items were deleted from the 
analysis due to their specific character referring to particular kind of stocks, instead of the whole 
market.  The cover page of the questionnaire stated that the survey was designed to better 
understand the opinions of experts in order to prepare a new questionnaire examining the financial 
knowledge of Poles.  This remark allowed the participants to feel more like experts whose opinion is 
needed for some further research rather then the persons examined.  Respondents were assured of 
confidentiality.  Demographic information was collected on the participants’ age, educational level, 
sex, and employment status.  All 40 participants were financial analysts or dealers employed by 
banks and Polish capital market institutions.  The questionnaire was carried out in Warsaw in June 
1999 during one of financial analysts meetings.  Each participant was responding the questionnaire 
without consulting it with others.  The procedure took 30-45 minutes. 
The items of the questionnaire were derived from commentaries in Polish economic newspapers, 
especially the financial newspaper: Parkiet.  The authors of those commentaries had used them as 
explanations of a past stock prices drop or rise as well as for predictions of near future market 
movements, so all items listed in the questionnaire represented real events. 
Three kinds of items were included: economic, political and from technical analysis. 
The participants of the questionnaire were asked to mark a score –3, -2, -1, 0, +1, +2 or +3 to 
each item, depending on how they estimated the impact of the item for the future (within a few 
weeks) behavior of stock prices (WIG index).  The examined analysts were asked on what market 
movement they would expect if certain event (or a technical analysis signal) occurred. 
The higher the score the stronger positive impact of the item on a stock prices rise.  Thus –3 
meant that the item was expected to evoke a strong stock prices drop, while +3: a strong rise.  0 
meant, that the item was regarded by the participant as a neutral measure. 
WIG is the main Polish stock exchange index; a total-return index encompassing all shares listed 
on the main market, calculated since 1991.   7
Statistical analysis of the questionnaire was done with the use of the StatSoft computer program 
Statistica. 
Additionnaly each respondent received a 10 – item questionnaire concerning general signals used 
in technical analysis.  The participants were asked how they perceive each of  10 technical signals in 
relation to its predictive power.  The possible answers were: predictive value, no predictive value, no 
opinion. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Which questionnaire measures are grouped in financial analysts’ minds? 
In order to determine which of the 56 questionnaire measures listed in Table 1 go together in 
participants’ minds a factor analysis was conducted.  Due to the small number of respondents in 
relation to the number of items a correlation matrix was used for further analysis.  The principal axis 
method of varimax normalised rotation factor analysis yielded 4 factors explaining as much as 45% 
of total variance.  The results are presented in Table 1.   8
 
 Measure  Factor 1  Factor 2  Factor 3  Factor 4 
1.   Dramatic rise in the 
value of a buy order  
0,88  0,13  0,11  0,01 
2.   High volume in blue 
chips after a long, 
horizontal trend  
0,84  -0,29  0,17  0,04 
3.   Reduction of interest 
rates  
0,82  -0,04  -0,02  0,02 
4.   After an index fall, a 
big overbalance of 
demand  
0,81  -0,03  -0,03  0,04 
5.   Dramatic WIG index 
rise after a horizontal 
trend  
0,80  -0,22  0,05  0,02 
6.   The beginning of an 
index rise accompanied 
with high volume after a 
long horizontal trend 
0,80  -0,04  0,04  0,03 
7.   Bullish situation on the 
world stock market 
0,77  0,15  -0,06  0,23 
8.  Continuous 
overdemand  
0,75  -0,18  0,13  0,19 
9.   The rise of foreign 
investment in Polish 
economy 
0,67  0,16  -0,16  0,16 
10.   New foreign investors 
joining Polish market  
0,63  -0,10  -0,23  0,12 
11.   Diminishing inflation   0,61  0,19  0,22  0,23 
12.   New domestic 
institutional investors 
on the market  
0,60  0,03  -0,13  0,02 
13.   Diminishing in 
amplitude of 
fluctuations after a long 
horizontal trend   
0,56  0,03  -0,01  0,31   9
14.   Right wing nationalist 
political parties win 
parliamentary election  
-0,40  0,25  -0,10  0,21 
15.   Dramatic WIG index 
drop after a horizontal 
trend  
-0,37  0,27  -0,33  0,22 
16.   Rising WIG index 
breaks strong 
psychological barriers  
0,33  -0,05  0,17  0,21 
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 Measure  Factor 1  Factor 2  Factor 3  Factor 4 
17.   After a big rise, WIG 
index creates a “head 
and shoulders” 
formation  
0,08  0,73  0,10  0,22 
18.   After a stock price rise, 
a big overbalance of 
supply  
-0,09  0,69  0,03  0,05 
19.   Moving averages 
trajectory (13 and 55 
weeks) characteristic 
for bearish market  
-0,03  0,62  0,04  -0,10 
20.   WIG index fails to 
surpass former peaks  
-0,14  0,58  -0,09  -0,24 
21.   Observable selling of 
large amounts of stocks 
0,19  0,52  -0,03  -0,16 
22.   Drop in oil prices   -0,08  -0,52  0,11  0,37 
23.   White candle (a kind of 
Japanese technical 
analysis) 
-0,02  0,50  0,04  0,01 
24.  Moving averages 
trajectory (13 and 55 
weeks) characteristic 
for bullish market 
0,47  -0,49  0,12  0,28 
25.   Continuous 
oversupply  
-0,31  0,43  -0,12  0,06 
26.   Positive reports of 
Polish market by 
foreign rating agencies  
0,47  -0,42  0,04  0,26 
27.   Populist political forces 
win parliamentary 
election  
-0,08  0,42  0,21  -0,02 
28.   Dramatic rise in the 
value of a sell order  
-0,03  0,42  -0,16  0,07   11
29.   A rise in the total 
numbers of orders on a 
bullish market  
0,29  0,41  -0,07  -0,28 
30.   The threat of break up 
of the present Polish 
coalition government  
-0,16  -0,39  0,14  -0,13 
31.   Diminishing dynamics 
of a rise in blue chips  
-0,13  0,38  -0,06  0,09 
32.   Street demonstrations   0,05  -0,36  0,36  -0,17 
33.   Falling WIG breaks 
strong psychological 
barriers 
-0,02  0,28  -0,12  0,06 
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 Measure  Factor 1  Factor 2  Factor 3  Factor 4 
34.   Unstable financial 
situation on emerging 
markets  
0,11  0,42  0,69  -0,09 
35.   Unstable economic and 
political situation in 
Russia 
-0,07  0,09  0,63  -0,06 
36.   High level domestic 
political affairs  
0,30  -0,38  0,60  0,00 
37.   High level foreign 
political affairs  
-0,45  -0,30  0,53  -0,14 
38.   Unstable political 
situation in Russia  
0,21  -0,07  0,48  -0,03 
39.   Post-communist and 
socialist forces win 
parliamentary election  
0,00  0,05  0,47  -0,06 
40.   Big stock emissions   0,23  0,37  -0,46  -0,01 
41.   Drop in the dynamics 
of economic growth 
0,10  -0,01  0,40  -0,36 
42.   WIG breaks its main 
rising trend line  
0,19  -0,27  -0,39  0,05 
43.   Diminishing 
unemployment  
0,47  0,21  -0,38  0,37 
44.   Drop in zloty to US 
dollar rate 
0,32  -0,11  0,33  -0,17 
45.   The beginning of 
recession 
-0,04  -0,04  0,25  -0,17 
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 Measure  Factor 1  Factor 2  Factor 3  Factor 4 
46.   Increase in dynamics 
of the indebtedness of 
the national state sector 
-0,29  -0,23  -0,07  -0,75 
47.   Increase in balance-of-
payment  
-0,10  0,01  0,28  -0,72 
48.   Increase in income tax   0,03  -0,02  0,25  -0,65 
49.   Increase in budget 
deficit  
-0,13  0,12  0,11  -0,60 
50.   Increase in corporate 
tax  
-0,25  0,05  -0,02  -0,59 
51.   Increase in the 
dynamics of 
privatisation  
0,30  0,03  -0,35  0,56 
52.   Industrial production 
decline  
0,08  0,23  0,27  -0,45 
53.   Increase in dividend 
tax   
-0,10  -0,28  -0,17  -0,44 
54.   Rise in coal prices   -0,37  -0,20  0,28  -0,43 
55.   Diminishing foreign 
currencies reserves 
-0,02  0,34  0,27  -0,43 
56.   Drop in blue-chips 
prices  
-0,17  0,28  0,09  -0,34 
 
Table 1.  Varimax normalised factor loadings.  Negative value of a factor loading means that the item was 
perceived as having a reverse impact on the future stock prices in comparison to positive value items.  
   14
Factor 1 can be interpreted as:  
The growth of foreign and domestic investments in the Polish stock market.  
Reliability results for the 10 highest loadings (absolute values) of items belonging to the factor: 
Cronbach’s Alpha =0,93 
Factor 2: 
The withdrawal of foreign and domestic investments from stock market. 
Reliability results for the 10 highest loadings (absolute values) of items belonging to the factor: 
Cronbach’s alpha =0.75 
Factor 3: 
Unfavorable macroeconomic and political signals. 
Reliability results for the 5 highest loadings (absolute values) of items belonging to the factor: 
Cronbach’s alpha =0.57 
Factor 4 
Positive financial and macroeconomic signals. 
Reliability results for the 5 highest loadings (absolute values) of items belonging to the factor: 
Cronbach’s alpha =0.79 
 
Actually two groups of factors can be derived.  Factors 1 and 2 constitute the first group. Factors 
3 and 4 – the second group.  Each group represents one “mind construction”.  The factors inside 
each group have effects in opposite directions.  It can be concluded that factors are not based on the 
nature of the items.  Economic, political and technical analysis signals go together, especially in factor 
1 and 2.  High Cronbach’s alpha coefficient indicates reliability of the factor structure. 
 
Which questionnaire items were perceived as highly influencing market movements? 
In order to examine which of the 56 items received highest, lowest and medium marks, indicating 
respondents’ opinions on their power to affect stock prices, a cluster analysis was carried out.  The 
cluster analysis was conducted in two stages.  A horizontal hierarchical tree plot and a graph of 
amalgamation schedule (Ward’s method amalgamation rule, Euclidean distances) indicated 3 main 
clusters.  K-means clustering (constant intervals) divided all 56 items into 3 clusters. 
   15
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Fig. 1 The plot of the means for each of 3 clusters.  Cases represent the questionnaire participants. 
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Cluster L consists of 31 items – including unfavorable economic, financial and political situation in 
Poland, negative technical signals.  
Cluster M consists of 7 items (Drop in oil prices, Rise in coal prices, Street demonstrations, Big 
stock emissions, Post-communist and socialist forces win parliamentary election, WIG breaks its 
main rising trend line, a rise in the total numbers of orders on a bullish market) which according to 
participants opinion have small or none impact on future stock prices. 
Cluster H consists of 18 items – including favorable economic, financial and political news 
accompanied by the technical signals of bull market. 
The participants marked 49 items as strongly affecting future stock prices (positively: cluster H; 
negatively: cluster L) regardless if their nature was economic, political or “technical”. 
The questionnaire participants opinion is that a great majority of items demonstrate rather strong 
impact on the future market movements, which is not conformable with the results of the analytical 
research (Cutler, 1989), (Fama, 1981), showing that only a small part of stock return variation can 
be explained by publicly known news. 
 
Inter-judge agreement  
Below 5 examples of histograms showing the distribution of scores are presented.  It can be seen 
that the great majority of the participants were unanimous about what impact a particular measure 
has on the future stock prices.  
Demographic features of the participants did not correlate in any way with their responses.  
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Fig. 2 Histograms of the values assigned to 4  items of the questionnaire.  The participants were asked to mark 
a score –3, -2, -1, 0, +1, +2 or +3 to each item, depending on how they estimated an impact of the item on the 
future behavior of stock prices (WIG index).  
 
QUESTIONNAIRE ITEM  MEAN SCORE  STANDARD DEVIATION 
A/. High level domestic political 
affairs. 
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C/. Falling WIG index breaks 
strong psychological barriers. 
  
-1,6 
           
0,97 
D/. Dramatic rise in the value of the 
buy order. 
           
1,8 
           
1,12   21
Technical analysis signals  
As the second 10-item part of the questionnaire (devoted exclusively to techical analysis signals) 
show, 
the participants regard most general technical signals as valid for market movements predictions.  
More than 60% of the respondents market the following technical signals as having the predictive 
value: MACD, RSI, Ultimate, ROC, Eliott waves and  Fibonacci proporsions.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
I.  The examined group of financial analysts distinguishes 4 factors (including economic, political and 
“technical” measures) on which stock prices depend: 
-  The growth of foreign and domestic investments in Polish stock market; 
-  The withdrawal of foreign and domestic investments from stock market; 
-  Unfavorable macroeconomic and political signals; 
-  Positive financial and macroeconomic signals. 
Thus, their cognitive structure is not based on the nature of the signals, perceived as economic, 
political, or technical measures.  The factors reflect two major mind constructs of questionnaire 
participants: macroeconomic conditions and the capital flow.  The first construct reflects the state of 
Polish economy and the second one describes the will of Polish and foreign market participants to 
invest in Polish stocks. 
II.   As other research demonstrated (Cutler, 1989), there are a few economic measures, which had 
certain impact on stock prices behavior.  However making the precise stock price predictions based 
on them seems to be too risky.  On the other hand there are many measures which impact is 
completely “esoteric”.  Evidently the questionnaire respondents do not make any distinguish between 
these two groups of measures.  Technical analysis persists in participants’ minds and its signals are 
treated equally to macroeconomic and political news in spite of the lack of any creditable evidence 
(Alexander, 1961), (Roberts, 1959) of its effectiveness.  What more, as the cluster analysis 
demonstrated, the respondents give a strong predictive value to a great majority of items listed in the 
questionnaire.   22
The second 10-item part of the questionnaire demonstrated that many technical analysis signals are 
generally appreciated by the participants and believed to have a predictive value. 
III.  The question arises as to why the well educated financial analysts regard so many 
unproven measures as being strong influences on stock prices.  This can be explained by one of at 
laest three reasons:  
a/.  they were taught to take these items as such,  
b/.  they have a strong motivational impulse to believe it, 
c/.  they subject  to some psychological inclinations. 
ad  a/.  There are many financial handbooks listing without any empirical evidence a lot of signals 
allegedly determining future market movements.  Some people including financial analysts take these 
statements for granted and believe them. 
ad b/.  According to the famous behavior-attitude relationship, discovered by Leon Festinger people 
strive to have their attitudes, beliefs and behaviors support one another.  When these components 
come into conflict, a person becomes uncomfortable and experiences a state of cognitive dissonance.  
To relieve this dissonance, the person will try to change the cognitions so that they will again be in 
agreement.  Financial analysts must have to strive to predict market movements and put a lost of 
effort in it.  If they were convinced about the randomness of stock prices movements, they would 
hold two cognitions: (1) they work hard to predict X, and (2) the X is random.  Because they cannot 
change the fact that they work hard, they can reduce their dissonance by changing their attitude 
about X.  They can come to believe that X is predictable.  (Worchel, 1995) 
ad c/.  Cognitive psychologist discovered dozens of psychological inclinations, which have big impact 
on human judgements.  Some of them financial analysts seem to subject to.  These inclinations are 
responsible for a long list of purely esoteric items chosen by questionnaire respondents as allegedly 
important in relation to future stock behavior.  Particularly interesting is the phenomenon that almost 
all the esoteric measures received the very high absolute scores both in cluster “H” and “L”.  This 
indicates how overwhelming those psychological inclinations could be.  Table 2 presents the esoteric 
questionnaire items ascribed to the following psychological inclinations.   
1/. Group thinking and group behavior.  People often represent group thinking and behavior, 
overestimate views shared by others and thus subject to panic and euphoria.     23
2/. Anchoring effect (Slovic, 1971)  Decision makers (investors) overestimate a recently quoted 
price level and this value serves as an anchor for further probability assessments. 
3/. Creating ad hoc, intuitive theories, noticing false correlations (Jennings, 1982),  
4/. “Law of small numbers”  (Kahneman, 1982), (Tversky, 1971).  People exaggerate how closely a 
small sample will resemble the parent population from which a sample is drawn.  When the 
underlying probability distribution generating observed sequences is uncertain, the law of small 
numbers will lead people to over-infer the probability distribution from short sequences.  This 
tendency to over-infer from short sequences leads in turn to misperception of regression to mean. 
5/. Ignoring the “regression to average” law. (Tversky, 1974)  Misunderstanding regression to mean 
gives rise to some spurious explanations for observed regression.  One of the implications of this 
inclination is that people expect too few lengthy streaks in sequences of random events, they tend to 
generate spurious explanations for long streaks that are determined by chance. (Rabin, 1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
No  Psychological bias  Questionnaire items 
1.  Decision makers are inclined to 
group thinking and group behavior 
and thus subject to panic and 
euphoria.  
 
Rising WIG index breaks strong psychological barriers 
    Falling WIG index breaks strong psychological barriers 
    The beginning of an index rise accompanied with high 
volume after a long horizontal trend 
    Dramatic rise in the value of a buy order 
    Dramatic rise in the value of a sell order 
2.  Anchoring effect (Slovic, 1971) -  
decision makers (investors) 
overestimate a recently quoted price 
level and this value serves as an 
anchor for further probability 
assessments. 
WIG index fails to surpass former peaks  
   24
3.  Ignoring the “regression to average” 
law. (Tversky, 1974) 
Moving averages trajectory (13 and 55 weeks) characteristic 
for bearish market 
    Moving averages trajectory (13 and 55 weeks) characteristic 
for bullish market 
    WIG index breaks its main rising trend line 
4.  Creating ad hoc, intuitive theories, 
noticing false correlations (Jennings, 
1982), “law of small numbers”  
(Kahneman, 1982), (Tversky, 1971). 
High level domestic political affairs 
    Unstable political situation in Russia 
    The threat of break up of the present Polish coalition 
government 
 
 
Table 2.  A list of psychological biases and the questionnaire measures referring to them.   
 
There is no proof that the questionnaire items listed in the Table 2 have any predictive meaning.  The 
respondents marked them as having such.  Why?  Besides the conitive dissonance phenomenon, 
whose impact is able to explain this bahavior, in the case of the items listed above additional effect 
can play a role: psychological inclinations and rules of thumb.  One cannot conclude that the 
questionnaire items such as: “Increase in the dynamics of privatisation” or “Industrial production 
decline” say something about the psychology of the market.  On the contrary, the items like: “WIG 
index fails to surpass former peaks”, “Moving averages trajectory (13 and 55 weeks) characteristic 
for bearish market” or “WIG index breaks its main rising trend line“ seem to represent certain 
common psychological biases. 
Fischer Black noticed that the noise is a major reason for the use of rules of thumb.  
 
“Even highly trained people seem to make certain kinds of errors 
consistently.  There is a strong tendency in looking at data to assume that 
when two events frequently happen together, one causes the other.  There 
is even stronger tendency to assume that the one that occurs first causes 
the one that occurs second.  These tendencies are easy to resist in the 
simplest cases.  But they seem to creep back in when econometrics studies 
become more complex.” (Black, 1986) 
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As research done by Kahneman and Tversky (1982) shows, even experience, expertise and learning 
do not virtually eliminate psychological biases.  The biases may appear as well in the behavior of 
highly trained professionals. 
IV.  There are many economic, political or technical signals occurring simultaneously.  In spite 
that the analysts are almost unanimous about how a certain event affects the market, they are not 
unanimous about which of the item is crucial at the moment.  This causes the randomness of stock 
prices movements.  On the other hand the unanimity among investors in treating a particular event as 
a valid signal of future stock price changes simultaneously may lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy on the 
market.  The self-fulfilling prophecy might be evoked not only by a strong common opinion on 
validity of some fundamental news but also by a common belief in a strong predictive power of 
esoteric measures. 
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